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Here are some thoughts on possible patterns of insurrection in Cuba. They are based on the following assumptions:

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That there is great bewilderment and soul-searching in Cuba regarding the regime's ties with the Soviet Union;
2. That disenchantment if not animosity has developed towards the Russians on what many Cubans will consider as a Russian betrayal in the hour of need;
3. That a growing group within the government bureaucracy and the militia is dissatisfied with Castro and might be awaiting a psychological opportunity to get rid of him and the top echelon;
4. That there are indications that an active conspiracy might be underway, involving groups in scattered areas, but with no firm grip on communications;
5. That some of the exile organizations, particularly JURE and the Liberation Army, might be quite acceptable external contacts to the internal opposition, now developing within the regime itself.

POSSIBILITIES

1. A "palace revolt" against Castro, aiming at his elimination. This might be a product of "Nasserism" within the regime and the desire to play the US against the USSR, while saving the basic structure of the present government.
2. A "palace revolt" aiming at the elimination of Castro as well as the communist old guard, with the purpose of bringing Cuba back into the hemisphere fold, but preserving many of the basic revolutionary structures. Such a revolt would count on certain external contacts, particularly on support provided by the Liberation Army and JURE, the two organizations that seem more acceptable to the dissatisfied 26 of July elements within the Cuban hierarchy.
3. A provincial revolt against the government, counting on the support of the inner opposition. This is a variation of (2). It contemplates initial action coming from the periphery, rather than from the main seat of power.

TIMING and COURSE OF ACTION

1. The pressure of international events and the developing strains within Cuba might precipitate action by the disaffected elements. The possibility of a sudden blow triggered, for instance, by Castro's assassination--should not be discarded, although tightening security measures might make this step very risky to those involved. Another deterring

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factor is indecision regarding outside reaction and the uncertainty of quick support.

2. As far as I have been able to assess (and my contacts have been very limited), JURE and the Liberation Army would favor this course of action:

a. As soon as the missiles' problem has been disposed of and the Russian hold has been weakened, a wave of sabotage should start aimed at striking vital installations (power plant, oil refineries, etc.). They consider this as a difficult, but not impossible task. They believe it is essential in order to show that the opposition is active and to fan smoldering discontent.

b. A propaganda campaign should accompany the sabotage effort. The gist of this campaign should be the desire to rescue and redeem the revolution from those that have betrayed it and sold it to the Sino-Russian bloc. An effort should be made to stress that all positive social conquests will be protected, that the clock will not be turned back, that the original drive for profound social and economic change should be recaptured and that this movement will respond to the deep seated Cuban urge for social peace and personal freedom. Such a campaign should avoid much of the semantics used by Cuban exiles. It should assure those inside Cuba that they will continue to run their country once Castroism and foreign domination are over. In other words, that the Cuban national revolution will march on unhindered to its original social and economic goals.

c. Help should be given to JURE and the Liberation Army to reestablish or strengthen their contacts with underground elements and the inner opposition. They are anxious to undertake this mission. As a matter of fact, some elements might wish to move ahead, even without adequate support. A feeling seems to predominate that as soon as the missiles question is settled, the time is ripe for action and that groups within Cuba are ready to strike if some kind of concerted plan could be put into operation.

d. The big question mark in the minds of the more responsible leadership is whether, in the light of the present international crisis, the US, with some Latin American help, would be willing to take forceful action in support of an uprising inside Cuba. Both JURE and the Liberation Army are against an outright invasion, but both would welcome quick and effective assistance if a key province such as Oriente is seized or if a given area is liberated by the militia.

e. JURE and the Liberation Army feel that not only US arms but an understanding US public posture are needed. The President, they feel,

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struck the right note in his appeal to Cuban nationalism and his support of the social objectives of the 1959 revolution. This is the US image that should be kept before Cuban eyes and special care should be taken to disassociate the US from the position advocated by many of the main exile groups. The Liberation Army feels that the US should not appear to support a Cuban counterrevolutionary effort led by exiles, but - when the time comes - it should back up a real uprising in Cuba, in behalf of the original revolution. Both groups feel it is essential to have a US commitment of support of a Cuban nationalist movement, even though it may follow a path closer to the original Bolivian or Mexican revolutions. This is a key psychological factor, in their opinion, in swinging many a discontented "miliciano" when the time for action arrives.

f. While there is increasing recognition that from an operational standpoint the CIA could give realistic professional assistance, I have the impression that the responsible leaders of both organizations will insist on high level political contacts before embarking on a concerted plan of action. They will also like to have Latin American cooperation, preferably from Costa Rica or Venezuela.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. At this stage in the crisis, it is essential that discreet contacts be maintained with a handful of Cubans who have friends and contacts within the Cuban government and are known inside Cuba for their loyalty to the original 26 of July Movement. Constructive Cuban thinking on possibilities of action is greatly needed. Contacts should not be limited to the professional covert level. The Cuban problem is immensely complex, from a political and psychological standpoint. No political blueprint with any chance of success could be devised in the United States unless it is based on close rapport with responsible Cuban leaders. A bridge of trust and understanding has to be erected.

2. It is impossible, at this stage, to create unity among the discordant exile groups. It is suggested that JURE and the Liberation Army be selected as the key contact elements. As a matter of fact, even within these organizations, contacts should be limited for the present to: Manolo RAY and Felipe PAZOS (from JURE) and Jorge BERUFF (Washington contact for the Liberation Army). An independent such as Francisco GARCIA Amador might be added because of his wide diplomatic training and his close friendship with Pazos and Beruff. These are four sophisticated, highly intelligent and relatively young Cubans, with a new generational approach to the Cuban embroglio. Furthermore, three of them (Pazos, Beruff and Garcia Amador) are closely identified with the Alliance for Progress operation. What should be obtained from them, at this time, is a carefully devised, realistic plan covering (a) operations inside Cuba; (b) psychological warfare against Castro; (c) a formulation of a social, economic and political program for the revolution redeemed, a program, however, recast

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in terms that the Cubans inside Cuba would accept and (d) the extent of US and Latin American assistance.

3. In this preparatory period, there is no need for a very precise US commitment in terms of operational support. What would be needed is a sympathetic US disposition to examine any program that operating mainly from inside Cuba and basically responsive to the present Cuban temper, would redeem the revolution. No effort has been made to the best of my knowledge to get together three or four highly intelligent Cubans, with wide experience and connections and closely identified with the 1959 revolutionary élan to tell us exactly what their thinking is on the immediate Cuban future. While our own plans are being formulated, it is advisable to have responsible Cubans recast the Cuban problem in their own terms and from their own values and perspectives. At best, this might lead into a joint blueprint for action. At worst, it might offer a significant insight into the difficulties that lie ahead in our dealings with the Cuban people.

ARA:AMorales-Carrión/vtb - 11/5/62

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